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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Focus of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's activities
during 1984 was directed to three broad areas of NASA's
responsibilities:
r,
1. The SpaceTransportation System (STS) operations and
evolving program elements,
2. Establishment of the Space station program
organization and issuance of Requests for Proposals to
the Aerospace Industry, and
3. NASA's aircraft operations, including research and
development flight programs for two advanced "X-type"
aircraft,	 -t
The majority of the Panel's activities were dominated by the
STS.
This report summarizes the Panel's 1984 review activities
and resulting observations, and enumerates the Findings and
Recommendations which the Panel deem to be appropriate to
highlight for NASA management attention. NASA's response to
the Panel's 1983 annual report is appended hereto; any matters
remaining "open" are noted in this ExecutiveSummary.
Government and industry support of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel and its work continues to be excellent, thus
enabling the Panel to fulfill its statutory responsibilities.,
6k 1
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Panel Meetings
The full Panel, or individuals and smaller groups of Panel
members, conducted 36 fact-finding sessions during calendar	
W
1984. These included meetings at six NASA centers and seven
contractor sites, and Vandenberg Air Force Base. in addition,
^.I	 9
A the Panel presented testimony before the cognizant committees
of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate and held
other discussions with congressional staff.
Space Transportation System Program
The STS increasing mission frequency places new demands
upon both management and the "hands-on" personnel, which will
remain at a high level. The standards set during the first 15
safe'and —successful missions are admirable and commendable. To.
maintain or even improve upon those standards will require
exceptionally perceptive management and disciplined execution
of the program. Among the more crucial program precepts, as
viewed by the Panel, are: recognition that the STS is a program
still. in transition from "single event demonstration" stage to
"operational" stage, , and,will remain such until the full
operational capabilities (and limitations) are known in
quantitative Lcrms based on scientific/engineering proofs;
recognition that complacency bred of repetition is an inborn
human hazard and conscious steps to avoid same are essential;
changes to hardware and software must be controlled to the
degree necessary to avoid overloading the processing team's
ability to safely implement them; changing contractual and
v
personnel arrangements must be carefully planned in advance;
recognition that quality requires strict discipline and is
everybody's business everyday; and the logistics system, at a
minimum, must be supported by its current level of attention
and funding,
f
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The successful orbital Refueling Demonstration Test
conducted during the STS-41G mission, the successful repair and
retrieval missions with previously launched satellites, and the
successful static firing of the first Filament Wound Case solid
Locket development motor (DM-6) are good examples of well
constructed and executed adjuncts that support mainline program
activities.
Basically the numerous elements comprising the STS ground
and flight subsystems have shown Mood performance and
dependability. There are, not unanticipated, some individual
components and subsystems which have yet to meet design
expectations and are cause for concern as flight rate
increases. These include: actuators and valves, fluid leaks,
instruments, Orbiter brakes, Orbiter external thermal
protection tile subsystem and its waterproofing, and Orbiter
structural restrictions. Shortages of flight-critical spares
continue to require extraordinary measures for each launch
preparation.
Taking all of this into account, NASA's planning for the
near term use of STS resources and forprocedural adaptiveness
continues to be thoughtful,_ thorough, and meets current, mission
needs during this STS transition period, albeit all the while
drawing upon a slim logistics support base.
The Panel has recommended the use of-Orbiter-102 as a
combined payload carrier and a development vehicle.
- With its
large array of instrumentation and recorders, OV-102 is an
ideal vehicle to acquire the quantitative data necessary to
fully define the Orbiter's performance capabilities and enhance
the data base for future vehicle design. The STSprogram
office concurs and a-detailed plan dovetailing mission
requirements and R&D needs is being constructed.
Specific Findings and Recommendations relating to the STS
3
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program are summarized in Section II of this report and are
discussed in greater detail in Appendix D. Topically they
concern:
*1. STS Launch Processing and Logistics
2. Space Shuttle Main Engines
3. Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters
4. STS orbiter Structural Life Certification and Adequacy
5. Extra Vehicular Activities,(EVA) and Life Sciences
6. Using orbiter OV-102 in an R&D Role
7. KSC and VAFB Common STS Operations
6. Shuttle/Centaur
9. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) as a
Spacecraft Power Source
Space Station
The Panel wasbriefed by the program management principals
at both JSC and NASA Headquarters on the Space Station concept
and plans that are currently being implemented. Early exposure
to the program was sought by the Panel to enable it to follow
safety-related matters from the conceptual decisions onward
through the design, development, and operational stages. The
Panel's areas of interest in Space Station will include manned
transportation, construction, residency, operations,
maintenance, EVA, hazard exposure, escape and rescue, and the
safety organization and safety requirements associated with
foreign participation. The Panel believes Life Sciences and
Space Medicine considerations must be among primary design
criteria. It is similarly essential that the Space Station be
designed for on-orbit maintenance, as basic design criteria.
NASA Aircraft Operations
The NASA Administrator has provided specific guidance
regarding aircraft flight operations policies and procedures: to
4
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achieve safe, efficient, and productive flight programs. 	 The
NASA Headquarters Aircraft Management Office has taken a number
of steps to implement the Administrator's directions, including
management instructions, revisions to the basic Safety Manual,
and assurance of periodic review of each center's flight
operations and safety programs.
For the first time in a number of years NASAis directly
involved in flight testing "X-type" aircraft, the X-29 and the
X-Wing aircraft.	 Both involve state-of-the-art-and-beyond
technical status with attendant experimental flying risks. 	 The	 -
Panel has initiated steps to stay abreast of the conduct of
these flight testing_ programs.
NASA Response to ASAP 1983 Annual Report
The Panel's 1983 Annual Report was respondedto by NASA
within-depth briefings at JSC and in writing by the
Administrator (see Appendix E.). 	 Most of the items are now
considered "closed", based on either adequate explanation or
implementation or plans to accomplish the activity. 	 There are,
however, some itemsregarding the STS that will continue to be
Of interest to the Panel.
The Panel continues to believe strongly that there are many
benefits to be gained from reducing landing speed of the
Orbiter (ref. 1983 Annual Report Conclusion and Recommendation
No. 6). While the Panel accepts NASA's response regarding the
impracticability of installing 'a specific solution such as
canard control surfaces on the present Orbiter vehicles, the
Panel urges NASA to continue to seek other, more readily,,
adaptable solutions.
Other major areas of the STS such as Product Quality, the
Orbiter External Thermal Protection System, Orbiter Structural
Adequacy, Space Shuttle Main _Engine improvement program, and
5
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maturing launch operations at Kennedy space Center (KSC) and
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) will continue to be followed
during 1985. In addition, the Panel will "touch base" on
specific hardware items such as Orbiter brakes, anti-skid
system, nose-wheel steering, Auxiliary Power Unit, and General
Purpose Computer improvement program.
Ni
NASA Aircraft Flight Operations are still.undergoing-change
and will be further reviewed by the Panel.
d
k
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II. Findings and Recommendations
1. Launch Processinc-and`Lodistics
FINDINGS
The transition to the Shuttle Processing ` Contractor (SPC)
was achieved in early 1984. The SPC and NASA are both to be
commended for commitment of effort and dedication to success of
the concept.
Each subsequent launch processing sequence to date has
generated anunexpected burden of modifications, change-outs,
repairs, and maintenance tasks._ Launch processing has thus
been anything but routine and there is no reason to believe
that "routine" operations are likely to be achieved in the near
future. In effect, the STS is presently in a'period of
"developmental evolution" wherein a number of key systems will
be changed ands one hopes, improved.
The Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) is 'struggling to
handle the-burden.of work associated with each mission. The
problems arise in part from difficult engineering tradeoffs and
need for sufficient advance planning of modifications to the
Orbiter; unexpected replacement of 'parts; some shortage of
qualified spares at KSC lack` of `necessary`piece °parts; some
shortage of qualified technicians in certain disciplines, and
heavy paperwork burden. The SPC must also assume launch
processing responsibilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base using
many of the same persons working at°KSC.
Although serious, these transitional problems are .neither
unusual nor unexpected, given the complexity of the STS, its
state of continuing development, and the large number of
personnel and institutions that must collaborate in launching
7
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the Shuttle. The challenge to NASA is to move through this
period of "developmental evolution" in a way that makes
feasible a sustained period of "operations" into the next
century. In other words, efforts and expenditures now to
improve the reliability, maintainability, and safety of key STS
systems should pay off handsomely in future years.
1
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. NASA management shoulu continue to allocate the human
and financial resources required to maintain acceptable levels
of safety in what in many respects is still a developmental
program from the point of view of the ultimate use of space as
well as the maturity of the system.
2. Modifications to the Orbiter--such as the main engine,
structure, avionics, ` and brakes--should be directed at
improving reliability,, maintainability, and safety as well as
achieving_additicnal increments'in performance.
3. NASA management should make a concerted effort to
identify and prepare for Orbiter modifications prior to
commencement of-the-launch processing sequence. "Freeze point"
discipline must be maintained. Unexpected changes and
modifications must be held to a minimum if the Shuttle
Processing' Contractor (SPC) is to achieve the projected' flight
rate.
4. Vesting overall Shuttle management in an "operations
entity" at NASA Headquarters would help achieve acceptable
levels of efficiency, productivity, and schedule reliability
during this period of "developmental evolution."" The Panel has
made thisrecommendation in past years and NASA management is
presently examining this and related issues through the Shuttle
Operations Strategic Planning Group, the Smylie Committee.
8
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f `	 5. NASA management would be well advised to avoid
{	 advertising the Shuttle as being "operational" in the airline
sense when it f..iearly isn't. More to the point, however, is
the fact that Shuttle operations for the next 5 to 10 years are
not likely to achieve the "routine" character associated with
commercial airline operations. Given this reality, the
continuing use of the term "operational" simply compounds the
F
r unique management challenge of guiding the STS through this
period of "developmental evolution." NASA should continue to
focus on making the STS as efficient, productive and reliable
as possible while the research and development flights are
defining the commercial use of space,
t
e.
2. Space Shuttle'Main Engines (SSME's)
FINDING
The three phase program to improve the SSME that was
P: initiated last year has been restructured so as to provide a
long term SSME technology program while staying within the FY
1985 congressional budget.
	 The modified program will not
achieve, all of thFi original objectives.
	 It will, however,
result in a more reliable and durable engine for operation at
1048 Rated Power Level (RPL) thrust with significant margin.
Operation at 109% RPL thrust with improved but limited life,
under hardware performance constraints will be_,,
 possible. __To
achieve additional margin and/or additional life at 1098 RPL
thrust requires the incorporation of the large-throat main
combustion chamber now relegated to the "Precursor" program, a
technology-oriented program looking at long-range engineering
advancements.
RECOMMENDATION
s
- The modified improvement program should be pursued
.'
vigorously.	 All reasonable effort should be exerted to develop
i _	 9
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the new hot gas manifold and to incorporate it at the earliest
date feasible. -Activ4L7 to reduce start and shutdown
temperature transients should be added to the"Phase 2+1'
	
r'	 program. Mis3ion planning should continue to consider 1049 RPL
thrust as the normal operating level for the engines. 1005 APL
thrust should be employed only for those missions dependent on
the higher thrust and as an abort capability.
g, . Sgme Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRMLSRB)
FINDING
The Solid Rocket Motor filament wound case may exceed
flight to ground system clearance interface limits due to the
filament wound case being more flexible than the steel case.
Data indicate that the modal frequencies of the filament wound
case are even lower than first estimated due to filament wound
case joint free-play.
I(ECOMMENDATION
An analysis and tests be performed on the filament wound
case with the total stack to establish lift-off loads and
vehicle excursions considering the lower modal frequencies.
4.- orbiter Structural Life Certification and Structural
Adequacy_
(1) FINDINGS
The structural, life certification program for the orbiter
is based on supplemental full-scale tests. However, two
extremely important: tests on the wing have not yet been
conducted which leaves the certification plan incomplete. The
	
e	 full-scale test for these two articles are very expensive and
show negligible fatigue damage based on a current simple
10
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The Panel agrees with the decision to certify these two
articles by analysis. A detailed analysis plan for the two
test articles should be developed and implemented to fulfill
the certification program for 100 missions.
1 °	 (2) FINDINGS
The Space Shuttle has to fly in regimes requiring high
performance missions with adequate ,launch probability. The new
"ASKA 6.0" Loads/Thermal/Stress cycle program is an important
part of certification because flight-measured data show that
the wing normal forces were larger and more aft than the A$KA
5.1 and ASKA 5:4 design loads. The ASKA 6.0
Loads/Thermal/Stress cycle will not be completed until 1987.
i
In the meantime, the Orbiter capability assessment (OCA) plan,
employing current algorithms, derived from flight test, has
been used to make launch decisions using a negative qoG profile
resulting in a loss of performance. Some wing/fuselage
modifications have been made and others have to be completed in
order to expand the Orbiter flight trajectory for future flight
missions. The flight and wind tunnel aerodynamic data base
used for the 6.0 Loads/Thermal Stress cycle (available in 1987)
may not be verified by the data from OV-102 instrumented
'	 flights. The proposed structural modifications will probably
not eliminate the restrictions now being required in flight.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Conduct a systematic review and document the structural
differences, safety margins and major logistics_ impacts for
each Orbiter vehicle. In recognition of these differences,
baseline the performance envelope for each Orbiter and, as
•	 11
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required t
 determine the trade-offs between any
structural/aerodynamics modifications and performance.
5. Space Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA's) and Life Sciences
FINDING
EVA will continue to be extensively used, both planned and
impromptu. The Space Station will require considerable EVA
initially for its construction and later for operational
activity. While the current suit has performed well, within
its limitations, there is need for a new EVA suit with improved
flexibility and higher internal operating pressure. Such a
concept is in the early development phase in NASA and needs to
be funded for further development and possible production as a	 ^'';
replacement for the current EVA suit.
RECOMMENDATION
NASA should encourage the development of an advanced higher
pressure EVA suit to replace the existing unit.
6. Use of Orbiter-102 in R&D Role
FINDING'
In responding to pressures for improved performance there
will be a continuing need to expand the STS ascent and Orbiter
descent flight envelopes (trajectories) creating the need to
obtain flight data measurements relating to structural loads
and aerodynamic behavior.
RECOMMENDATION
Orbiter OV-102 is the most suitably instrumented of the
Shuttle fleet and should regularly be utilized as a research.
12
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and development vehicle in addition to its normal mission
activities.
7. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Vandenberg'Air Force Base
(VAFB) Common Operations
FINDING
In the near future, at least in part, common launch crews
will be used at both KSC and VAFB and unless the schedules are
coordinated conflicts may arise, particularly in the case of
DOD's "on demand" launches. The conflicts may not be
restricted to schedule but also as to vehicle.
RECOMMENDATION
Until such time as the KSC and VAFB sites have their own
launch crews and dedicated orbiters, the manifesting or
scheduling activity should have a procedure to consider the
schedule effects on crews who must travel back and forth.
Also, attention must be given to the availability of specific
Orbiters that may be required by specific missions. This is
particularly critical in those cases where the DOD may be
required to ask for an unscheduled launch.
8. Shuttle/Centaur
FINDING
The development_ of Centaur for Shuttle is on a very tight
-schedule. with but 30% of system weights being actuals,
performance margins for the currently planned planetary
missions are quite small and expected to decrease. Resolution
of issues raised by some of the requests for safety waivers
submitted by the Centaur project has not yet been achieved.-
This isa=consequence of additional operational constraints
13
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introduced by the inclusion of abort modes for the Orbiter that
do not providethe originally specified time for Centaur
propellant dumping. There is also an issue concerning the
interpretation of certain specifications for some Centaur fluid
system components.
RECOMMENDATION
while acknowledging the fact that the issues are being
addressed, the Panel urges that the matter of the safety waiver
request and the interpretation of specifications be resolved
with careful deliberation. The ability to make and incorporate
significant design changes for Centaur G' within the time
remaining to the planetary opportunity for Galileo is fast
s	 diminishing. With the major portion of the Centaur G'
,
qualification test program_ remaining to be conducted, it would
be highly desirable that the Centaur project staff be able to
concentrate on insuring that the test requirements are met.
9. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG's) for Galileo
and Ulysses Missions
FINDING
I
Both the planetary Galileo and solar Ulysses missions-
employ RTG's as the spacecraft power source. Obtaining
clearance to fly such nuclear systems is a 'complex matter both
technically and managerially. Relatively recently it was
recognized that the capacity of theRTG fuel elements to
survive overpressures that might be encountered under _certain
launch system failure modes might be less than had been
anticipated. Concurrently, it was found that there were 	 p
disagreements about the - interpretation of experimental data
used to estimate overpressures that would be generated for
certain failure modes. Also, the probabilities of the several
failure modes had not been agreed upon. During the last half 	 y
14
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of 1989, steps were taken by all organizations involved to
resolve the issues in a fully coordinated manner.
RECOMMENDATION
The.Panel endorses the proposal madeby the ad hoc
committee that addressed the issue to improve coordination
among the organizations involved by appointing a "single point
of contact" on this subject for each organization. Further;
the Panel endorses the recommendation to assign prime
responsibility for obtaining flight clearance to the science
mission center, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
10. NASA Aircraft Operations
FINDING
The record over the past year has been good. Progress is
being made in providing up-to-date flight standards for both
transport (administrative) aircraft and for experimental
aircraft. Aircraft operations management resides in the
Aircraft Management Office at Headquarters which reports to the
Associate Administrator for Management. It is the Agency focal
point for all NASA aircraft policy and related matters.
The responsibility for development of flight standards is still
somewhat fragmented as it is currently left to the various
centers to establish and maintain them. The Aircraft
Managemerit Office has 'requested the'Intercenter Aircraft
Operations Panel to provide a "guidelines" document to serve as
the basis for the management instruction to be issued by
Headquarters giving central direction covering all NASA
aircraft operations.
r
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The Aircraft Management Office as the Agency focal point
' for all aircraft operations and related matters should include,
if practical, an aviation safety function.	 The NASA centers
would benefit by a single reporting location at Headquarters.
n
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N III. Panel Plans for Calendar Year 1985
Panel Membership
The Panel membership and consultant. support has changed
somewhat from the previous year. John C. Brizendine is the new
Panel Chairman, Charles J. Donlan is a new member, Herbert E.
Grier a former Panel Chairman and long-time member will become
a Panel consultant in January 1985, and Lt. General Leighton I.
Davis has elected to retire from the Panel in December 1984. A
new consultant, John P. Reeder, has been brought on in support
of Panel's "X" aircraft activities.
After completing 12 years as both a member and Panel
Chairman, Herbert E. Grier, will become a consultant to the
Panel on January . 18, 1985 when his current term is completed.
Mr. Grier's knowledge of NASA and its manned space program will
continue to support Panel activities as the Space
Transportation System transitions to full operations and the
Space Station emerges as a full-blown program.
Candidates for membership are being screened at this time.
The following is a brief resume of Mr. Reeder:
Mr. Reeder started with NACA/Langley on June 2, 1938.
Following 4-1/2 years of wind-tunnel research, he was trained
by-NACA/Langley as a. research pilot and flew in that capacity
with NACA/NASA for 25 years retiring after 42 years with NASA
in 1980. lie played an active role in the early development of
handling qualities requirements for military and civil
airplanes and the development of fixes and improvements to
World War II aircraft. He performed early exploration of
transonic phenomena pioneering in the exploration of the
effects of sweepback . and rotary wing and'-V/STOL aerodynamics,
17
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performance and handling characteristics. 	 During
 this time, he
flew transperts for NASA/Langley and NASA Headquarters. 	 He
served as Head of Flight Operations, Assistant Chief of the
Flight -Mechanics and Technology Division, Chief of Research
Aircraft Flight Division, and managed the Terminal Configured
t Vehicle Program.
	 Research pilot experience include 235
different'_single and multi-engine, civil and military, land and
vea aircraft types (90 jet airplanes,	 40 fighter types,	 61
rotary wing types including British, French and Garman, and 8
VTCi, airplanes).
Mr. Reeder has been author or co-author of about 80
NACA/NASA technical reports and papers and is a Fellow of the
` Society of Experimental Test Pilots, a Fellow of the American	 -:
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 	 (AIAA), an Honorary
Fellows of the American Helicopter Society 	 (AHS).
Panel Activities for 1985
Specific areas of interest will include the following.
These, of course, may be modified as the fact-finding
activities develop and as new concerns are brought to the
Panel's attention from within NASA as well as external sources;,
1. Space Transportation System - The Panel will continue
to assess Orbiterstructures and functional subsystems;
External Tank donlyif significant modifications are made to
it); continued review of all aspects of the Space Shuttle Main
Engine program; Shuttle Processing Contractor/NASA progress at
ri KSC and VAFB 
as 
the flight rate increases, hardware ages and a
new launch site becomes operational (design modifications to
launch facilities to accommodate increased Filament Wound
Case/SRB excursions, Centaur integration, bringing the second
launch pad into operation at KSC);'human factors associated
with increased flightrates;Solid -Rocket Booster steel case
r-
reuse, Filament. Wound Case qualification; for flight, ;range
16
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the FWC, and the potential use of hybrid cases, i.e., mixed FWC
and steel.	 From a logistics viewpoint the Panel expects to
look at:
'	 o The problems associated with obsolescent parts.
o Adequacy of the publications with regard to such
things as the correct reflection of the
configurations of each individual orbiter and the
incorporation of the data gained from
trouble-shooting experience.
o The plans to assure spare SSMEs and/or spare high .
pressure fuel and oxidizer,turbopumps to cope with
anomalies or use of higher thrust levels.
o The development of an overall comprehensive
maintenance plan for the entire STS system
including orbiter and SSME overhaul up through
1990.	 Major structural and other modification
programs projected for the orbiter at Palmdale and
engine overhaul and update at Rocketdyne would be
part of this.,
o Meeting or advancing the 1988 date for final
"spares lay-in to support maximum flight rate" and
what helps determine this,.e.g., manufacturing lead'
times or limits of present funding?
o	 The possibility of transferring "sustaining
engineering" activities from JSC to the operating
bases at KSC and VAFB earlier than the 1989 period
so as to support centralized control over
operations.
T
2.	 Payloads - The several upper stages in so far as
r	 `,
19
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they affect the mission safety. The Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) under USAF cognizance and the Payload Assist Motors
(PAM's) a commercial development will be covered at a low
level of activity. The Shuttle/Centaur G' and G vehicles
and their support activities will continue to be reviewed.
An area of some special interest because of the new and
untried aspects is the Tethered Satellite System, as will be
any internal/external experiments which can have an effect
on safety of the STS missions (e.g., EASE, ACCESS and so
on)
3. Space Station - As a developing program it is the
Panel's intention to maintain close touch with the NASA
organizations involved and, where practical, provide support
and achieve a thorough understanding of the underlying
concepts and philosophy and how they are expected to be
implemented from both a management standpoint and technical
approaches. For example, the degree to which "lessons
learned" from NASA and commercial operations of highly
technical facilities are applied. The evolution of the NASA
organization and the relationships with industry will be of
interest.
4. NASA Administrative and R&D Aircraft Operations
The Panel will again participate in the Intercenter Aircraft
Operations Panel and aircraft safety meetings ,. Additional
time will be spent on the X-29A program as it is flown by
NASA personnel in an "X-type" R&D program. The X-Wing
program will also be examined with an eye toward assuring
that the review system and the safety network are adequate
to assure not only first flight safety but subsequent R&D
flying safety.
5. As appropriate the Panel will support NASA as it is
requested to fulfill its obligation to both NASA and the
Congress regarding safety of NASA activities and the public
20
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IV. Appendices
I	 A. Panel Activities Conducted in Calendar year 1984
J
The Panel continues to operate with fact-finding
sessions conducted on the average of three times a month.
el	 Individuals, small groups and the Panel focused on the
transition period of the Space Shuttle as the flight rate is
being increased to meet user's requirements, the emerging
Space Station program and various aspects of NASA's
administrative and R&D aircraft operations. As always the
Panel usually uses scheduled, special and on-going
activities at government and contractor installations to
minimize the burden placed upon those we meet with and, more
importantly, to obtain the most current. information and
maintain an open communications line with all whom we deal iwith. The responsiveness of all levels of NASA and others
has been most gratifying and shows an excellent working
relationship.
The technical and administrative support activities
provided by the Panel Staff Director continue to prove
invaluable to the Panel in meeting its objectives through
continuing in-depth knowledge of the many facets of NASA
activities.
The Panel's relationships with the congressional
committees and subcommittees and their staffs remains at an .
excellent level. This provides a feed-back system to assure
that the Congress is aware of the Panel's activities and
their results and that the congressional requirements are
factored into the Panel's-fact-finding, sessions throughout-
the year.
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AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL FACT-FINDING SESSIONS, 1984
SUBJECT SITE DATE MEMBER i
Shuttle Turnaround KSC 1/17-18 Parmet
Analysis Group
i
• Intergrated Logistics KSC 1/25-26 Parmet/
Panel McDonald
Flight Readiness NASA HO, 1/25 Donlan,
Review for STS-41B Downey Grier,
Himmel 1{
Members of Computer NASA HO 1/30-31 Battin
Failure Review Team
3331
Orbiter Stability La RC 1/31- Davis,
i
J
& Control 2/1 Donlan
1
Annual Meeting NASA HO 2/15 Panel
w/Administrator
House U.S. House of 2/23 Panel
Testimony Representatives
Senate U.S. Senate 2/28 Panel
Testimony
Space Station Human ARC 2/27 - McDonald
Factors Meeting 3/1
Space Processing KSC 3/5,-7 Parmet,-
Contract Stewart
Phase II 'Shuttle/Centaur JSC 3/13-15 Himmel
Safety Review
F
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Flight Readiness Review NASA HQ & 3/30 Brizendine,
for STS-41C RI/Downey Grier,
Donlan
Filament Wound Case MSFC 4/4-6 Donlan
Rocket Motor Technical
Interchange Meeting
NASA Aviation Safety Ft. Rucker 4/11-18 Davis
Officer's Meeting
f
AL
Abort, Orbiter Handling JSC 4/24-26 Panel
Characteristics, Autoland,
Space Adaptation Syndrome,
JSC Aircraft Operations
Integrated Logistics NASA HQ 5/2-9 McDonald
Discussions
NASA Aircraft ARC 5/3-5 Davis
Operations
Safety review on airborne General 5/8 Elverum,
& ground hazards/risk, )ynamics, Himmel
Critical Design Reviews, Sad Diego
Centaur
SSME-Project RD/Canoga 5/10 Elverum,
Park Himmel
Shuttle Autoland JSc 6/8 Battin
Discussions
Filament Wound Case for Hercules/ 6/19,	 20, Panel
Solid Rocket Motor Thiokol 21
Technical Review &
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site inspection
Space She,ttle Main NASA HQ 7/11-12 Himmel
Engine Anomalies
future progr,%m direction
Orbiter Canards & LaRC 7/31 Donlan
Ditching
Panel Testimony U.S.	 House of 8/2 Stewart,
Representatives Donlan
USAF Space Transportation VAFB, CA 8/21-22 Panel
System Operations
Orbiter RI/ 8/23 Panel
Palmdale
Space Adaption JSC. 8/31 Parmet
Syndrome Seminar 9/1
Space Station orientation JSC 9/25 Panel
STS Training & Simulations, JSC 9/26 Davis,
Aircraft Operations Battin i
Shuttle: Processing KSC	 - 9/26 Brizendine,-
Contractor/NASA Donlan,
Operations McDonald
Centaur Project LeRC 10/17 Himmel
X-29A Forward Swept DFRC 10/28 - Donlan,
Wing, Pre-Flight 11/2 Parmet
Readiness Review
1
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Panel Activities/
Discussions
Space Shuttle Main
t	 Engine Development
Program Phase II, IIA
}	 Centaur Management-
I(	 Meeting
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Staff of the	 10/30
	
Brizendine
U.S. Senate &
House of
Representatives
Rocketdyne
	 11/9	 Elverum
Canoga Park
JSC
	
11/15	 Himmel
Orbiter Life Cycle.	 RI/
	
11/16	 Stone
Certifiation Loads	 Downey
Life Sciences	 NASA HQ
	
11/29-30
	
Parmet
Update on STS,	 NASA HQ	 12/5-6	 Panel
Space Station
X-Wing Discussion	 NASA HQ	 12/17	 Reeder,
Krone
NOTE: Dr. Himmel was a member of a three-person Special SSME Review team
visiting RD/Canoga Park, NASA HQ, and_MSFC on `a number of occasions.
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Panel Chairman
Mr. John C. Brizendine, Chairman
Formerly President, Douglas Aircraft Company
Members
Dr. Richard H. Battin	 Mr. John F. McDonald
Charles Stark Draper Lab.
	 Formerly, VP TigerAir
Mr. Charles Donlan	 Mr. Norman R. Parmet
Formerly, Dep. Assoc. Admin NASA HQ
	 Formerly, VP TWA
Consultant, Institute Def. Analysis
Mr. Gerard W. Elverum, Jr.
	 -Mr. John G. Stewart
VP & Gen. Mgr. TRW Space Group	 Ass't Gen. Mgr'. TVA .
Mr. Herbert E. Grier
	 Mr. Melvin Stone
Formerly, Senior VP EG&G Inc. 	 Formerly, Dir.; Structures
Douglas Aircraft Co.
Ex-Officio Member
Dr. Milton A. Silveira
NASA Chief Engineer
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i
Consultants{
a
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel Mr.. John P. Reeder
Formerly, Assoc.	 Dir. Le RC Formerly, NASA Research
Pilot
	
4
L,t. Gen.	 Leighton I. Davis
USAF
	 (Ret.)
Staff
Mr. Gilbert L. Roth Miss Susan Webster
Staff Director Program Support Assistant „-
4
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C. Panel Correspondence With Congress
sr	 '
There are items that come to the attention of the Paned
which are considered valuable enough to warrant providing
Panel comments and thoughtful considerations for
congressional perusal. The letters which follow are typical
Of this type of correspondence. It is a part of the process
noted in previous sections of this Annual Report noting the
open forum, cooperative approach attached to Panel
activities,
29
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July S, 1984
Honorable Slade Gorton, Chairman
Subcommittee on Science, Technology
and Space
United States Senate
Washington, DC	 20510
Dear Mr Chai man
As Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel I believe
it is appropriate to comment to you and your Subcommittee
regarding the auto shutdown of the Orbiter Discovery's main
engines during launch sequence on June 26, 1984.	 The Panel
believes it is particularly important to do so in view of -J
the negative connotations in the media reporting of the
event, which may have created misleading impressions in the
minds of the public regarding the safety of the astronaut
crew and the soundness of the Space Transportation System.
a
In fact, the system operated precisely as designed.	 The
launch sequence was stopped automatically when the computer'-
detected a mismatch between actual engine start function
signals and the pre-programmed, required function signals.
Thus this design safety feature performed as intended to
ensure the safety of the crew and the vehicle system.	 This
should bring positive connotations rather than negative
_ones.
We of the Panel view the Space Transportation System as a
program still in transition from the development stage to
the operational stage.	 Due to the nature of its missions
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and the necessary complexities of its hardware and software,
the transition period will continue for some time into the
future. It would be a misconception and an unrealistic
comparison to expect airline-type operations from the Space
Transportation System (although it can be rioted that even
sophisticated jetliners experience some departure delays and
occasional cancellations for technical reasons). The
important consideration is that each mission be carried-out
safely and successfully. The Space Transportation System
safety record is 100 percent thus far, and we are pleased to
see the design performing to maintain this record.
Respectfully yours,
John C. Brizendine
Chairman
Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel
-
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September 14, 1984
Ronorable Harold L. Volkmer
Chairman, Subcommittee on Space
+ Science and Applications
U.S. Rouse of Representatives
Washington, DC	 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
1 was pleased to substitute for.Chairman John C. Brizendine
in presenting the views of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory
r
Panel at the Subcommittee's hearing on August 2, 1984, to
review Space Shuttle requirements, operations, and future
p plans.	 In reviewing the transcript of the hearing,
especially the discussion among William A. 'Anders,
representing the NASA Advisory Council, myself, and
subcommittee members, I was struck by what at times appeared
to be the contradictory assertions that, on the one hand,`
the Space Shuttle should be viewed as a research and
development vehicle for the duration of its operational life
and that, on the other hand, NASA should move toward
creation of an independent entity within NASA to manage
Shuttle commercial operations since NASA's R&D centers were
not well suited for this-long-term operational
responsibility.	 Given the importance of these roles and
f relationships for the future of the Space Transportation
System, I thought it might be of help to the Subcommittee if
I attempted to clarify this line of thinking. 	 These are my`
X personal views although I believe they reflect the general
;i thinking of other Panel members.
w
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In discussing continuing R&D as it relates to the Space
Transportation System, several facts must be kept in mind:
11	 Many of the original systems and equipment
items--especially in the areas of general computers,
avionics, and navigation--are obsolete and must be
replaced or significantly upgraded.
2. Critical systems, such as the Space Shuttle Main
Engines, the auxiliary power units, and the brakes,
have performed below expectations and should be
upgraded.
3.
- The complete flight envelope for the Orbiter has not
been defined as yet and its definition may indicate
the need for structural or other changes to the
Orbiter.
4. The need for increased hardware reliability and
reduced turnaround time is likely to dictate
equipment and system improvements for many years to
come,'
5. A new generation of upper stages, principally the
centaur and the IUS, must be incorporated in Shuttle
operations if the full capability of the STS is to
be realized. -
These facts indicate clearly why a continuing program of R&D
is essential to the safe and efficient operation of the
Space Transportation System. In other words, there is no
way NASA could responsibly "freeze" all design elements at
the present stage of STS maturity.-. As a consequence,
Shuttle operations are not likely to resemble those of a
commerical airline in the near future. To assume such
highly predictable routine operations is to ignore the
33
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important R&D tasks still underway and the uncertainties
that inevitably are part of any R&D effort. We can
realistically expect elements of this R&D program to
continue into the 1990x.
w^
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The Shuttle can also provide a useful "test bed" to evaluate
various advances in space and astronautics in much the same
manner as industrial R&D will be carried on in Spacelab and
other missions. For this reason the Panel's statement at
the recent hearing noted:
	
"...the Orbiter itself is the
only vehicle capable of negotiating the complete velocity
and Heating encountered during STS missions. This knowledge.
would help resolve current problems and point up future
technical directions. The high technology information_ which
would become available through its use would also.be
applicable to advanced commerical and military vehicle
design."
In short, an adjunct R&D program focused principally on
upgrading the operational characteristics and reliability of
the Space Shuttle is essential'.	 This program in my view,
can be directed most effectively by an entity within NASA
charged exclusively with commerical operation of the Space
Transportation System. 	 Such an entity, discussed by William
Anders and myself during the question and answer period, has
been recommended by the Panel in our 'last two annual
reports.	 NASA has taken several initial steps in this
direction.
This operational entity must` necessarily draw heavily upon
the scientific and engineering expertise of the NASA R&D
centers in much the same way that NASAuses outside
contractors.	 However, the R&D agenda maintained by the
operational entity would reflect those task related to
improved' operations, rather than the much wider agenda of
innovations that could be supported by the R &D 'centers
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relatively free of the discipline of commerical operations.
The perspective is one of fundamentally accepting the Space
Transportation System as it presenty exists, subject only to
the improvements and changes discussed earlier in this
letter.
As we noted in our testimony, even an R&D agenda focused on
such operational priorities will be substantial and will
require considerable funding support in the coming years.
This R&D program will move the STS steadily in the direction
of greater reliability, greater cost effectiveness and
enhanced safety. It will help bring to full operational
maturity the world's first reusable space vehicle and set
the stage for the next generation.. This essential work, in
my view, can be directed most effectively by an entity
within NASA that has achievement of this operational
maturity as its principal mission.
I hope these additional views are of assistance to the
Subcommittee.in its important review of the STS. If I or
other members of the Panel can be of further help, please 'do
not hesitate to call on us.
Sincerely,
John G. Stewart
Member, Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel
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Do Fact-Finding Results in Calendar Year 1984
1. Space Transportation System Launch Proce®sing
While the Space Transportation System (STS) in 1984
demonstrated its unique versatility and usefulness in space
it	 -	 - through a number of highly succe ssful missions # its problems
(e.g., tiles, engine changeouts) on the ground continued to
challenge NASA management, the R&D centers, and NASA
contractors, especially those responsible for launch
processing. Launch and landing operations encompass
activities at KSC, VAFB and the many secondary and
contingency landing sites as well as reaching into the
development centers and their contractors. The Panel has
focused on the developmental aspects of the program
affecting , the management needs of the current period, the
hardware/software requirements, resource needs, and the
r.
	
	
integration of STS operations from the factory to the launch	 s`
and landing sites. The ultimate management form ,•,and the
means to achieve it are under study by NASA with no definite
approaches as yet selected. Some points, however, have
em rged:1
o_ There must be no disruption in the operational
support adequacy and ability to safely launch and turnaround
the Space Transportation System as currently - operating.
o Personnel are a key resource and provisions must be
made to "feed in" new people to replace, as necessary, those
leaving.
IA	 o Hardware and software, as required, will require
.e
updating and replacement owing to obsolescence, aging or
inability to obtain replacements.
16
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o Traditional organization arrangements, review
methodology, handling of payloads, and system certifications
cannot remain static but will change with STS maturity and
• accompanying knowledge: and objectives.
o Complacency at any point in the process must be
guarded against.
o A specific aspect of the management process which
bears further attention are the "Program Freeze Points" and
their use. Program freeze points are established at
specificA ntervals during flight processing. Freeze points
are defined as those points in time when the design,
definition, and content of the cargo, integration
hardware/software and flight design, vehicle flight
hardware/software, crew activities/stowage and launch site
flow are complete. Subsequent to these points,, only
mandatory changes to the hardware, software or affected
documentation are permitted (mandatory changes are those
necessary to ensure crew/vehicle safety and /or
accomplishment of primary mission objectives). Such freeze
points are established for each mission:
o Preparations for contir,"ency landing site (CLS)
activities must be planned to meet'mssion goals and to
minimize expenditure of resources which can best be used
elsewhere.
o Operational efficiency as measured by such things as
turnaround time reduction, hardware increased reliability
(increased mean time between -failures), -increased crew
effectiveness, weather predicting, are all a part of
operations. Since Day-of-launch winds can affect vehicle
aerodynamic loads, better trajectory shaping and load_
reduction can be accomplished with winds as near to T-0 as
possible. The actual "doing" part of launch and landing
-	
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along with retrieval of SRS's has-been proven through the
fifteen STS missions to date. However, one area of
l	
continuing interest is the impact of flight vehicle and
ground equipment hardware and software changes ( both generic
and mission unique) and procedural changes upon the ground
sites, including modifications to the launch constraints or
so-called "red-and-blue lines," With regard to any of these
the safety impacts continue to be analyzed covering such
things as=
- Hazard analysis if a hazard is defined. This
	
1	 includes evaluation of single failure points, redundancyt
interaction between "improvement" and interfacing
	
_	 hardware/software/procedures/facilities.
Many enhancements are to eliminate and/or downgrade
current hazards, i.e., accepted risks and controlled
hazards.
The human element, particularly with respect to
launch preparations and the turnaround itself, require
inspection of "hands-on" impacts which may lead to
additional training requirements.
Each mission has provided - a more substantial level
of experience upon which residual design limitations are
being corrected. Significant operational enhancements are
being studied for eventual implementation for both mission
use and turnaround time optimization. A concerted "lessons
learned" exercise is underway with NASA, the SPC, R&D
centers, and development contractors to understand and
correct the management and engineering problems encountered
	
j	 in launch ; processing. , These commendable actions underscore
:.1 the developmentalnature of the programs at present. This
^r {
period of "evolutionary maturation' is likely to run to the
latter years of this decade . ` in this regard, a number of
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developmental aspects of the program are of continuing
interest:
o 'There are a number of hardware items, especially in
the avionics arena, that are obsolete and must be replaced
or significantly upgraded. Attendant software impacts
would, oficourse ? depend upon the equipment. included here
are brakes on the Orbiter which consistently have performed
below expectations.
o Achieving the desired Orbiter/stack flight envelope
requires further loads definition and Orbiter structural
analyses.
o Maintaining and increasing hardware reliability
(life) remains a significant part of the program plan and is
likely to dictate equipment and system ground and flight
improvements for many years to come. This ,includes the
reliability and safety of the so-called "upper stages" which
although technically called "payloads" are integrated into
the Shuttle operations.
It is reasonable to expect variances and adjustments
to plans and timetables based on the above considerations
and consequently STS operations are not likely to resemble
those of a commerical airline There is, then, no practical
way to "freeze" all of the design elements in the future.
It has been the Panel's opinion for several years
that this multi-faceted management challenge would be met
most effectively through creation of a STS operations entity;
to assume overall direction of these developmental and
management activities, using, the R&D centers in much the
same way that NASA draws on the expertise of its development°
contractors. (See, for example, the letter of Panel member,
John G. Stewart to Honorable Harold Volkmer, U.S. House of
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Representatives, September 14, 1984 in the Appendix C.)
A complementary area of interest is the pre- and
post- flight mission reviews. The Panel notes, as it has in
the past (see Annual Report dated January 1982 and January
1983), that the management review processes remain little
changed from those used on early missions. With an
increased flight rate, maturing systems and hands-on
resources * there remains the involvement of a large number
of high level management personnel. Changes made to date in
this review system have certainly helped but further
streamlining should be expected in the future.
Very encouraging progress is evident in gaining
control of the complex overall logistics program.. The
Integrated Logistics Panel ( ILP) and its dependent
coordination meetings appear to be gaining satisfactory
control of the 'problems. Cooperation between USAF personnel,
at Vandenberg and NASA personnel at the JSC,. KSC,-and MSFC
centers appears to be excellent and the overall efforts have
regained a lot of lost time.
The Panel has previously recommended that a
comprehensive maintenance plan be established partly as a
system to prevent interruptions in the ,launch rate through
the 1990 period and beyond and partly to provide a more
rational basis for the current logistics"plan . which is now
under way. While some elements of maintenance planning are
evidentthere does not yet appear to be a total plan which
would include contingencies such as multiple SSME failures
or planned withdrawal of an orbiter for structural fatigue
examination or replacement. This 'sort of maintenance
overview may indeed exist and will be examined by the Panel
in the future.
The SPC`in its operations has uncovered some
40
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problems; the most serious of which is shortage of spares.
Line replaceable units (units designed for rapid
replacement) are in short supply and the only alternative is
to "cannibalize" that is to remove a working component
from another Orbiter and pay back the loan when the part
becomes available. This is a costly procedure in terms of
manhours andldeilay but the safety implications are those of
violating a certified system to get the necessary parts.
Another significant problem is that of the workload caused
by the incorporation of modifications on the Orbiter at KSC.
Even though modifications are scrutinized before the
decision is made to incorporate them, further controls may
have to be instituted if the launch rate requirements are to
be met. The next year or so should see some improvement in
logistics and support problems as the SPC program advances
I^
satisfactorily.	 1
If OV-105 is ever funded it will have the beneficial
effect of providing a "standby vehicle in the Orbiter fleet
but at the same time will sop up most of the available
"production spares" thus exacerbating the problems
surrounding each individual launch toward the 1990s. The
goal is presently some 20 flights per year from KSC and 4
per year from VAFB. There has been a sizable transfer of
experienced personnel from KSC to VAFB and we were told that
there are about 1200 LSOC people there now.
One of the greatest impediments to rapid turnaround:
time at KSC - apparently second only to shortage of 'spares -
is the continuing need for modifications. It is true that
every modification requirement is most carefully scrutinized
by various engineering ,committees but the cumulative effect
of all of these, together with the poor-fit difficulties, is
causing considerable 'distress' . at t ►e launch site. This
entire issue goes back to the question of major overhaul,
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maintenance planning and the inevitable backlog of
modifications will constitute a pacing element. Not much
"on-line repair" is being accomplished at KSC which again
points out the need for a more definitive maintenance
program.
Clearly, the decision has already been made not to
include the logistics, supply and support elements of
Spacelab, Shuttle/Centaur, Inertial Upper Stage and Payload
Assist Module in the ILP considerations. However, it still
appears that while funding and control of logistics are
separate issues the apparent "hands-off" attitude could well
result in launch delays unless they are well stocked with
spares. The importance of avoiding launch delays because of
payload ?roblems is as important as preserving the logistics
support integrity of the STS itself. It is, after all, a
system and launch delays have sequential effect upon
downstream program where only one launch pad is operational.
2. Space Shuttle'Main Engines * (SSMV s)
The accumulated data on'SSME turbomachinery has made
it amply clear that the engine is being operated near the
upper limits tolerable to thedesignp and that margins are
not sufficient at 1098 of nominal power to permit reuse
'without frequent (every other flight) change out of various
turbopump components. This situation is relieved by
limiting, normal flight operation to 1048. However, even at
1098 the engines still have displayed a variety of random
wear and damage problems partly associated with design
inadequacies and partly associated with manufacturing and
maintenance quality issues.
At the end of 1983 a Three-Phase Program was
undertaken at Rocketydyne to systematically address these
issues. The Phase IL and Phase III parts of the program
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were well-planned to understand the operating limits and to
analyze and correct the stressing areas. The basic goal of
the program was to improve the operating limits for
components showing less than 5000 seconds at 1098, but also
in reality to provide improved margins. at 104% for higher
flight confidence and lower-coat maintenance.
The focused goals of Phase II were to:
o Increase the HPFTP turbine temperature redline
margin from 140OF to 250OF by: improving the HPFTP
efficiency, and reducing the turbine back pressure
o Eliminate the turbine sheet metal cracks
o Increase second stage blade life on both the HPFTP
and HPOTP
• Increase first stage blade life on HPFTP
• Correct the liftoff seal bypass leakage problem of
the HPFTP
o Improve rotor stability on HPOTP to increase whirl
margin
o Improve bearing life of the preburner pump and
turbine of the HPOTP.
The Phase II program was fully reviewed by some of
the Panel members in late 1983 and again in May and November
of 1984. The progress made by November 1984 has been
impressive. Significant improvements have been made in both
the HPFTP and HPOTP. Of real importance however is that in
many of the problem areas new fundamental understanding of
design criteria have been achieved so that the .changes in
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certain areas represent different and lower-stress operating
regimes.
For example, the 500-RPM FPL margin on whirl on the
HPOTP has been increased to almost 7000 RPM. This
effectively eliminates the problem and provides a known high
margin. In another case, a new understanding of the dual
turbine bearings dynamic load transfer has resulted in new
clearance griteria and reduction to a 12 ball bearing from
13 balls. The reasons for the wear initiation and surface
degradation are understood, and the new design clearance
provides acceptable operation at all conditions within the
designed ball excursion vs radial pre-load region. These
and other basic improvements in turbine blade configuration
and coatings, welding criteria, etc., have provided a
configuration for a new certification program starting in
early 1985.
About mid-1984 the Phase III program was eliminated
by NASA. It was replaced by a much restricted Phase II+
activity and a longer range technology oriented Advanced
Development program. The very limited Phase II+ program
does not address most of the items identified in the 1983
Phase III Plan. The only significant change planned for
certification is the new hot-gas manifold (HGM), and that
UGH will not be introduced into the fleet until about CY
1988. Other key elements of Phase III: will be evaluated in
a "Precursor" portion of the Advanced Technology program.
The elements include single tube heat exchanger with no
internal welds, a large throat diameter main combustion
chamber and advanced design turbomachinery. Since the
"Precursor" program is technology-oriented only and very
funds-limited, it is clear it will not really permit timely
introduction of the major changes in turbomachinery nor
large-diameter Main Combustion Chamber necessary to provide
the desired final operating margins at 1098. 'Although major
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progress in operating life of components was achieved in the
Phase II work, this really relates to replacement cycle-life
and not to the environment reductions critical to increasing
margins which were planned for Phase III. It is our
Judgement, therefore, that the SSME should continue to
operate with the 1048 limit to the greatest extent possible.
This will assure that the gains in changeout time are
maximized with the attendant cost savings, and that margins
are satisfactory for flight reliability:
Only after the Phase Ii+ and Precursor
modifications ►
 particularly the large throat chamber are
certified will the goal be achieved of providingoperational
environments and margins at 109% equal to those now extant
at 1048. When that is accomplished one can designate the
SSME upgrade as a rated-power engine of 109% of the original
rated power level.
4
	
	 Another aspect of the engine improvement process is
the desire on the part of NASA to inject a provision for
competition into the large liquid rocket field. This is
being pursued through advertised requests for proposal on
various aspects of the SSME program (i.e., using the current
nozzle, engine controller, low-pressure pumps and such with
new powerheads and high pressure turbomachinery). The idea
appears to be that the SSME would be designed to operate at
1158 thrust with full life, 30 missions certified with 60
missions demonstrated, and would be capable of operating at,
say, 1208 thrust with reduced life and being able to
throttle to 508 (which can not be done with current engine).
Further, with changes to the low pressure pumps and with the
same high pressure pumps, there is a possibility of :growth.
to a 1308 thrust engine. All of this would require about 8
years for fruition and actual flight use.
3. ' Space`Shuttle"So11d-'Rooket Boosters
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The interaction of the Filament wound Case (FWC)
with'the total STS stack may cause liftoff loads and vehicle
excursions to be in excess of the launch mount capabilities
at KSC or VAFB. Even though the loads may be controlled by
the use of Belleville spring mounts in the hold-down post at
VAFB it still may be more critical than KSC.
The SRM filament wound case segments have already
been produced for flight, development and qualification
units.
Analysis has been performed using scale model tests
to predict modes and frequencies. However, it will take a
full scale test to measure vehicle deflections accounting
.
	 for the FWC joint free-play.
The twang test scheduled for January 1985 derives
influence coefficients for primary bending, but does not
predict the secondary modes and frequencies during firing
and lift-off, it may be possible to calculate or test for
the effect of FWC joint free-play and accountfor secondary
modes and frequencies, but It may be worthwhile to measure
actual_ deflections during an SSME ,firing to provide assured
data.
The Panel is concerned about the tight limits placed
on the current schedules.
4. Orbiter'Structuril Adequaay'and 'Life Certifica tion
The Orbiter OV-099 -was statically tested for '32 load
cases to approximately 1.2 times limit loads (ASKA 5.4 loads
cycle). Approximately 33 fatigue/fracture/acoustics
supplemental test articles have been completed successfully,
except for one which will be completed shortly`in
`	 accordance with the certification plan. A scatter factor of
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-four was used in these fatigue and fracture tests- It was
decided to delete two tests because of cost and negligible
damage shown by analysis due to the fatigue spectra. For
instance, tension stress in the lower wing skin is
'	 approximately 30,000 psi.. The Orbiter is designed for 100
missions whereby a commercial transport is designed for
50,000 flights. The one article. "LI 31°, outboard
elevon/flapper door/wing portion of rear spar has been
tested to 100 missions of acoustic fatigue as test WA-18.
The mechanical fatigue and ultimate design load conditions
have not been tested. The specimen is now in storage.
The other article, "LI 36", wing/mid--fuselage/aft
fuselage has not been tested for fatigue, ultimate design
loads or acoustic environment. The specimen will be put
'into storage. In this case, the fatigue is negligible,
acoustic loads' small however, ultimate strength will not be
demonstrated. It is the Pansy's opinion that the test of
one wing with a simulated carry-through structure is not
representative of the wing-fuselage intersection inboard of
wing station 167.	 {
It is therefore recommended that these two articles
be certified by analysis.
Orbiter Wing and Fuselage Modifications Stature
	 i
The Orbiter OV-099 and OV-102 were designed to the early
ASKA 5.1 loads. The Orbiter OV-103 and OV-104 were designed
to ASKA 5.4 loads with weight savings incorporated only
where loads were lower than ASKA 5.1 loads.
The flight test data from flights STS-1 thru STS-5
showed that the wing loads were larger and more aft than
design loads during ascent requiring wing modifications at
Xo 1191 and wing, spar modifications: on OV-103 and OV-104.
I. ^ B'
Leading edge moment -ties were requiredon all Arbiters due
to the increase in down loads in changing the trajectory to
more negative.gcd (dynamic pressure x angle of attack).
Mid-fuselage straps were required on all Orbiters due to
stringer torsional instability caused by higher thermal
gradient during descent. Beef-up of 1307 bulkhead was
required on OV-103 and OV-104 due to higher delta pressure.
Beef-up of 1307 bulkhead on oV-099 and OV-102 ,_ which did not
incorporate weight savings, will be decided by further
analysis.
Current algorithms derived from flight test data using 	 t'
load indicator gauges defined the increase in wing loads
during ascent more precisely resulting in a new package of
wi•ig modifications. These modifications include upper wing
panels, rib caps-, internal and wing/fuselage carry-through
structure, fittings and bolts. This package of work is 	 =`
sized for a nominal qoL of -2500 but may have to be changed
to'goc. of -3000 if all the modifications can't be
accomplished in accordance with required schedules.
Table number one shows the status of Orbiter, wing and
fuselage modifications. These modifications will not allow
a'nominal qaL of -1250 to be attained as originally planned
therefore further modifications may be required at a'later
date.
ASKA 6.0 Loads/Thermal/Stress Cycle:
The 6 . 0 loads/thermal/stress cycle program is proceeding
on schedule. The flight measured data are being
incorporated into the 'analysis data base using ascent 	 -
aerodynamics, ascent loads, descent aeroheating and descent
thermal analysis. The large -protuberances, Orbiter shape
and trajectory regimes have made it difficult to predict
wing loads and its distribution within 20 to 30 percent.
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The aerodynamic data base used wind tunnel analysis, cold
.plume simulation and Apollo-Saturn Launch Vehicle fit
experience. However, the.flight test data showed plume
effects larger, normal force larger and more aft, higher
local pressures and left/right wing differences.'
Operational flight data has been used to check ascent
aerodynamics, descent aeroheating and thermal analysis to
optimize trajectory shaping, make recommendations for launch
and is used to complete the 6.0 loads/thermal/stress cycle.
The 6.0 environment, basic math model development, entry
external flight loads and landing loads are nearly complete
with final data including ascent flight loads available
February 8, 1985 for entry into internal loads model.
The internal loads analysis will be available September
15, 1985 with stress analysis margin of safety results
available March 15, 1987 and final reportAugust 15, 1987.
OV-102 instrumented flight data available in early 1987 will
verify the data base used.
Wing airload (predicted pressures) using flight strain
gage data shows increase•in pressures at upper wing and
lower wing station Yo=250.- This explains why normal loads
are larger than design ASKA 5.4 loads. The flight-derived
wing indicator gages 'show excellent predictive capability
for shaping trajectories.
Aeroheating/thermal analysis using updated thermal math
model shows good correlation with flight data although it is
slightly conservative. Temperature gradient predictions are
still a problem.
6.0 loads/thermal/stress cycle is proceeding according
to plan but can't be accomplished.in  less time than
scheduled. Final verification of database used for 6.0
49
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TABLE 1
ORBITER WING i FUSELAGE MODIFICATIONS STATUS
ORBITER VEHICLE 6V-099	 OV-102
	
OV-102	 OV-104
'R Design loads cycle 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.4
Thermal LRSI/HRSI LRSI/HRSI AFRSI AFRSI
F Protection System
Configuration
Wing Mod's (1) Not Req'd Not Req'd Req'd Req'd
Wing Spar Mod's Not Req'd Not Req'd Req'd Req'd
Wind Mod's (2) Req'd Req'd Req'd Req'd
Leading Edge Complete Req'd Complete Complete
Moment Ties
E^ Mid-fuse, Straps Req'd Req'd Req'd Req'd
6
1307 Sulkh'd Analysis Analysis Req'd Complete
Instrumentation Complete Remain Sched. Sched.
Sched.	 (1985) (1(f85) (1985)
Missions Ulysses/ Galileo/
Centaur- Centaur
(5/86) (5/86)
y . Major Mod's KSC Palmdale Palmdale
6/84 to 1/85 (Comp
Many syst chug 12/84)
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(1) Xo 1191 crawl hole doublers & wheel well beef-up
f	 (2) Wing cover, ribs s internal structure
LRSI m Low temperature reusable surface insulation
HRSI - high temperature reusable surface insulation
AFRSI Advanced felt reusable surface insulation
"r
F
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I5.	 Space Extra Vehicular Activities ( EVA^s) 6nd'LLEe
-	
Sciences
EVA's are becoming a normal part of the STS mission
time-lines in support of repair, maintenance, retrieval and
specific scientific and technical experiments.
As evidenced by the many and varied EVA operations
during 1984 there appears to be no problem with the current
methodology which includes the reduction in cabin pressure t:
from 14.7 psia to 10 . 2 psia hours before donning the suits
which are then pressurized to 4.3 psia ( pure oxygen).	 The
return is accomplished in the same manner.
	 Space Adaptation
Syndrome (SAS) still appears to be a problem for a majority
of the crews and may even have affected, for some period,
those doing EVA work.	 It is apparent that the crew training
for EVA is thorough, and certainly covers the work to be
done each time in meticulous detail, _which provides for
r
safety as well.
	 The Extravehicular Mobility/Maneuvering
Unit ( EMU) or space suit, has instrumentation necessary to
status EVA operations.
	 There is some question in-house as
to the value of additional instrumentation or enhancements
that would allow EMU ' consumables resource status in order to
assess new EVA task andprocedures for optimization. 	 Such
.implementation would require measurement o£ a few new EMU
parameters and telemetry of these new parameters along with
some currently measured parameter to a central, recording and
analysis, point.
	 These data could allow understandingof
task and procedures design as they affect man's integration
into the EVA workplace.
	 Specific parameters to be
telemetered include Liquid Cooled Garment "inlet and outlet
temperatures, 02 bottle pressure, suit pressure, -II
-	 electro-cardioge-sphy, battetry , power remaining, limiting
consumables and possibly o+_hers.	 Some can be obtained
through derived parameters such as heart rate and LCG
temperatures.' We believe this instrumentation would allow
A
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the accumulation of a much needed expanded empirical data
base.
r
61	 Use'of'Okbiter 10216 a6 1W) 'Role
The Shuttle, despite being pronounced "operational"
by NASA after its fourth flight, is far from being
"operational" in the sense that term is commonly understood
in the airline industry. Many thousands of test flight
hours are normally accumulated on a commercial airplane
before it is finally certified for routine commercial
service. The Shuttle was declared 'operational" to announce
its availability as a payload carrier vehicle although it
is far from "operational" insofar as its measured structural
and aerodynamic characteristics are known. For example,
wing loads are not yet symmetrical and somewhat higher in
certain areas than predicted. Consequently, until more
complete flight data is available, Shuttle ascent and
descent trajectories must be tailored conservatively to
avoid overstressing. If the Shuttle is to attain its
maximum performance goaJ,^,, far more extensive flight data is
needed than is now available. Orbiter 102 is the most
completely instrumented vehicle of the fleet and is capable`
of providing the needed data when used as an R&D vehicle.
There may be times when it would be , worth giving priority to
this role over more routine missions. In past flights, data
F	 have been lost because of instrumentation system failure.'
It is suggested, therefore, that because of the small number
of flight opportunities the instrumentation (particularly
recorders) should be redundant to guard against loss of data
in the event of failures.
6a. Use df " Canard "SUrfaaes fo Reduae ' Orbiter ' Landing
$peels andEnhance-its'$tatiiltY
Langley Research Center conducted studies of the
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use of canards on the Orbiter. As expected the canard
°configuration does eliminate the undesirable negative lift
increment using the current elevon design. The
investigationswere somewhat limited and did not go into a
great number of combinations of Orbiter angle of attack,
canard angle of attack, surface areas, and other effects.
It would represent a major configuration change requiring
years of research and development effort. The Panel i6
sympathetic with the reluctance of the Shuttle Program
Office to undertake such a development when simpler
Modifications are in the offering. For example, it is the
Panel's understanding that the'DFRF "TIFS" (Total Inflight
Simulator) is to be used to explore some modifications to
the Shuttle control system that earlier studies atAmes
Research Center indicated could improve the handling
qualities by decreasing the pilot induced oscillation (PIO)
tendency.
7.- _KSC_and VAEB Common'Operations
For some substantial startup time -- years not
months
	
the 'rate of Shuttle launches from VAFB will be too
low to justify the establishment of a complete launch 'crew
that would be inactive for most of the year. The present'
plan is to use selected military personnel that have had
training at KSC as permanent VAFB personnel and at each
launch move the rest of the required crew from the NASA
ranks at KSC. -None of these people have had the opportunity
to train at VAFB and hence the crews must be in residence
some appreciable time before each launch, most particularly
before the first launch'at VAFB.
While this would seem to be a straight forward
scheduling job it is complicated by two-facts. First, the
60D may be required by circumstances to 'ask for an
°	 unscheduled launch on short notice. Second, the Orbiters
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•­are not identical from a structural load capability and .
certain loads may require certain Orbiters. The scheduling
problem is not bad if one formally identified it and is
aware of the limitations it may impose on the joint
operations. A subsidary but important point is that the
launch crews have not trained at VAFB nor has the facility
been exercised. The Panel has recommended that an FRF be
e; conducted at VAFB prior to the first launch as a facility
and crew, certification. A bonus to such a test would be a
partial insight into the "Twang" effect on the stack under
the VAFB hold-down conditions.
Common ground support equipment interfacing with
m'	 the space Shuttlevehicle requires special attention so that
consistent functional design and such interface
characteristics are rigidly maintained since loss of
configuration commonality may occur due to KSC or VAFB
programmatic requirements.	
f1rm
r
S. Shuttle/Centaur
r
The development of the Centaur G & G' stages is
progressing only slightly behind schedule. Some changes in
interface_,
 loads haveresulted in redesign; of parts of the
Centaur. This had contributed to the small performance
margins for the G' stage for the planetary missions with but 	
i.
30% of the Centaur systems weights being based on actual
hardware. It is anticipated that further reductions in
margin will occur.
Significant progress has been made in the
development and qualification test programs although the
bulk of the program remains to be accomplished. Among the 	 -
tests completed are the acoustic test of the G' forward and
development adapters and the structural stiffness and 1.2 x
limit load tests of the Centaur support structure (CSS). In`
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both of these tests design assumptions were verified.
Preparations are well under way for the major
systems tests. These include: test of purge and insulation
systems; AL.-up structural tests of the CSS, tank # adapters
and spacecraft mass model under cryogenic conditions, and a
modal survey test of the stack just noted,
Electronic systems tests have progressed reasonably
well. Some units have completed qualification tests. All
Design Evaluation tests (to qualification environmental
levels) have been completed satisfactorily. Formal
qualification has been delayed_ because of >problems in the
procurement of electronic parts and devices.
a
Three requests for safetywaivers had been
submitted to the Shuttle Program office;. Two have been
approved. The third, dealing with the Centaur fill, drain
and dump systems is still under consideration. This system
was designed to a requirement that it be able to dump all
Centaur propellants in 250 seconds in the event of a Shuttle
w 3var. r- VLWO .
 Y A" -&W%IU LOLIML16 WOO OOUQ A MISQY, %F&M 6=4.'
abort modes which do not have 250 seconds available for
propellant dump have been identified. The implications of
the situation are being assessed. Design changes or
operational changes to mitigate the problem are under
discussion. The time available to implement any changes is
limited because of planetary .launch opportunity constraints.
... ...
 ...... ...... ..._.,,.
9.	 Radioisotope Thermoelectric " Generatoi (RTG)'
The Panel is aware of issues associated with the
Radioisotope Thermal Generator (RTG) to be used on the
Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft. The concern is'with'the
possible spread of radioactive material if there is a:
catastrophic destruction of the SRB's and ET's during pad or,
5?'
i
10. NASA'Air6iiki'666iiii6ns
ascent phases, or during a landing as the result of an
aborted mission. The.Panel has not had , a,review of on-going
activities except to note that they are many and diverse in
nature. Suffice it to say that the Panel believes that
adequate management and technical attention is'being •paid to
RTG, concerns.
NASA has been long concerned With safety of
operations for program support; and R&D aircraft. To meet
the challenge posed by a "zero occident" desire, the NASA
Administrator called for "an action plan that will result in
standardized and consistent policies and guidelines to the
centers." Such a plan has been developed by the NASA
Headquarters Aircraft Management Office and is in process of
implementation:
Ste6 * 1. Revise and publish the NASA Management
Instructions (NMI's) that give guidance for the management
of aircraft resources and aircraft related matters (7910.1),
that establish policy and guidelines for airworthiness and
flight readiness reviews (7910.2), and that govern the
management and operation of NASA administrative aircraft.
Step 1 was completed in September 1984.
Step-2 Revise and publish volume 7 of the basic
safety manual (NHB 1700.1) to provide a step-by-step
procedure for use to perform safety hazard analyses. -It is
planned to send this revision to the centers for comment by
June 1985.
Step 3, Cause to be published a memorandum for
each Program Associate Administrator having line
reponsibility over centers with aircraft directing the
implementation of certain policies and procedures which have
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..been established by Headquarters but to date have received
limited acceptance by some centers. This step was completed
in October 1984.
s@eB A. Formalize the policies in step 5 through
the publication of a management instruction. Target for
completion of the instruction is October 1985. A draft will
a
	 be ready for review at the February 1985 meeting of the NASA
Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel.
st" e6 . 5. Continue to conduct periodic reviews of
the center aircraft operations to improve safety. 'Periodic
review of each center's flight operations is ongoing.
The NASA Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel,
composed of the Heads of flight operations at the various
centers continue to play a major role in the area of safety
assurance. This Panel reports to the Associate
Administrator for Management and provides the technical
guidance required to centrally manage the diverse missions
comprising NASA"s flight operations. The Aviation Safety
Officer meetings continue to be held to provide
concentrated interchange of safety related information. For,
purposes of repeated emphasis the Panel is particularly
interested in two areas affecting accident causes and
investigation: human performance, including sensations
perception,. cognition s
 judgement or reactions, produced that
leads to degrees of human performance; secondly,
instrumentation which may be available in case of aircraft
problems.
We , plan to monitor the X-29A project through its.
early phases of flight testing. This includes attending
appropriate sessions to observe and participate in the
evaluation flight test results and future vehicle testing.-
Plans are to fly the airplane within a limited flight
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envelope, until early May 1985 when the airplane will begin
two months of downtime to receive an updated flight control
system prior to resuming further flight testing.
New technology items of interest include:
.,^ 19 Thin super critical ( 49) wing with forward sweep.
2. Aerolastic tailoring of wing with composite
stressed skin.
3. Relaxed static stability of minus 35%.
4. Close coupled canard with variable incidence.
5. Three horizontal control surfaces, canard wing and
&• strake.
6. Discrete variable camber wing.
7.- Triplicated digital flight control system.
ceA
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E. NASA's Response To Panel's Annual Report Covering CY
1983
The following document, dated August 30, 1984, is the
complete letter responding to the Panel's Annual Report
dated January 1984. Those items of continuing interest to
the Panel are noted in Section I t Executive Summary.
61
1 ,
ORIGINAL PAGE 0.
OF POOR QUALITY
tf
Mr. John C. Brizendine AUG 30 1984 	
wChairman, Aerospace Safety
k ' Advisory Panel'
6306 Bixby U121 Road
Long Beach, CA	 9081$_
ba
Deer John:
In response to the ASAP's Annual report to NASA, JSC
' provided the Panel with an in—depth briefing on April 24-26
1984, on those progremeatic'and technical issues which the Panel
had raised.
	
This in-depth review closed a number of actions, and-
for some issues the approach to :resolve them was presented,	 This
letter presents a top laves overview of,the status	 of	 those
Issues raised by the Panel and our plans for
	 those areas still
open.
As you are well aware,	 I rely heavily on the	 Panel's	 !-
counsel,
	
and I wish	 to iterate our appreciation.
	 If further
E_E, information is required, please contact me.
4 Sincerely,
07iylzcl B$gzea In
Ices M Beggs
James y . Beggs
Adeinistrator
Enclosure
i =r.
ORIGINAL PAGE Ib
OF POOR QUALITY
1. Product Quality and Utility
ASAP Recommendation:
NASA and contractor employees, both design and production,
should nowbe looking at hardware improvements with opeystional
suitability rather than increased performance asthe dominant
	 -
goal * , NASA should give added attention in assisting contractors
and subcontractors to achieve high quality products oriented
toward such operational suitability.
NASA Response:
I believe that the Panel addresses two subjects in
the conclusions and recommendations for product quality
and utility, namely #
 motivation and changes to enhance
operaxions. I totally support the Panel's position on
the need to emphasize motivation of the Space Transportation
(STS) design team to yield the highest quality product
oriented toward operational suitability. To be effective,
such an ef.tort Lust originate with senior management.
To emphasize my commitment to quality production, I have,
	
t
established the position of Director of Productivity in
the Office of Froductivity Improvement and Quality Enhancement.
	
64	 I have personally addressed numerous groups and also have
prepared a'video tape for use by our subcontractors. We
	
Y'	 established the NASA Productivity Steering Committee, that
I chair, which has Headquarters Associate Administrators and
Center;Directors as members. Our objective is to examine NASA
policy and fundamental changes to improve operations. Our first
meeting was held 'at`MSFC on April 26-27, 1984. The conference
was attended by more than 200 persons including representatives
from 50 different aerospace companies. Our goal Is to arrive at
new approaches and initiatives to enhance the productivity of
NASA and its contractors. Along those lines we have implemented
a quality circles program at Headquarters, called NASA Employee
Teams (NETS), and at the field centers. They>are•also In
ope`ration.at • practi'cal'ly"ail • of our major, contrac•tors..
Reports so ,far indicate that the centers and their prime
contractors have enthusiastically taken to this initiative. As
an example, Leven II at JSC has recently issued -a directive to
all their projects requirin; field reviews of hardware to
determine the occurrences of unknown failure modes and premature
wear, thereby checking qualification and verification program
	
f	 results. The Level III Orbiter Program Office has initiated a
	
l	 Product Quality Improvement Council at Rockwell, which includes
Rockwell and their subcontractors., It is "results' oriented and 	 1
provides meritorious citations where quality and usability have	 i
	
i`	 remained at a high level or have shown improvement. The results
-	 of these efforts show an overall reduction in the number of
nonconformance reports. Rockwell has initiated several personnel
and hardware programs to enhance product, quality such as their
	
q `	Product Quality Assessment Team that examines the hardware it the '
2• subcontractors, and their Empioyne Motivation Program that
rewards plant personnel based upon peer nominations. In addition,
all quality plans are approved by the President of the Orbiter
Division. Production/productivity quality re4lows are held'
Ir	quarterly, thereby providingfor lover level information to reach
top management.
F
I	 Other NSTS contractors, lose, Martin, Thiokol, and
Roeketdynep have similar programs. The key to the overall
	 -
program has been to involve senior management as well as all
disciplines concerned* Rather than provide the Panel with
numerous details, I recommend that you include such a discussion
Item on your agenda when you visit those organizations.
With specific regard to operational suitability, the,NSTS
program has an on-going hardware enhancement effort the goal of
which Is to optimize, Insofar as possiblao KSC's turnaround
process. To meet that goal, the Orbiter Project Office continues
to process appropriate ground and flight equipment changes to
achieve a turnaround time of 35 workdays by the end of September,
1984, which should support our STS flight manifest -through-FY'86.
To provide you an understanding of the extent of our efforts, the
following is a partial list of candidate enhancements for studyt
thermal protection system; deletion of the ammonia boiler system;
heater blanket test receptacles; opening the payload bay door
without Orbiter power; solid polymer electrolytic fuel cells;
OMS/RCS simplification for removal, installation, and test;
restriction of connector retest to critical circuits only;
Orbiter brakes modification; and upgrading the main engines
to reduce maintenance and inspection. Some changes that have
already been approved up through the Orbiter level Include:
Orbital Maneuvering System pod commonality, Aft Reaction Control
System tanks commonality, wiring for cargo battery charging,
component heater blankets, and moving the desiccator from behind
the storage locker.
.:..
	
2. Space rShuttleaMain Enaine•(SSME)
ASAP Recommendation:
The SSME program should proceed with full NASA support
and resources to firm up the content and planning for
SSME improvement and to implement the program and pursue
the obyectiveq vigorously. Retrofit of certified Improvements
during scheduled' or unscheduled removals of the engines Is firmly
recommended. The plans should continue to include the activity
on 'a full redesign of the high pressure turbomachines;that Was
begun this year. The AerospaceSafety Advisory Panel believes
this effort to be necessary to achieve the margin of safety`
required for routine, operations and Song ,life of the engines.
As testing to demonstrate margin for operation at the 1092
D
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level will involve operation at thrust levels higher then 109X,
these will be temptation to increase the Shuttle performance by
	 j
utilizing higher thrust * The ASAP advises strongly against such
a decision. Operational reliability, and the 'concomitant safety
can be achieved only by operating the enginesat-thrust'ievela
below the maximum demonstrated in a few tests to show that a
margin exists.
t'
NASA Response:
NASA managementis fully supportive of SSME .';mprovements. 	 j
We are committed to the Phase It modifications of the high
pressure lox and fuel tutbopumps-and have presently allocated
i75.7M in FY'84 and $55.5M in PY'85 for design, development, and
tasting to be performed by the engine contractor. As part of the
Phase III program, a complete redesign of the lowhigh pressure
pump is underway,
It is the Intent of NASA to preserve the margin that !a
being designed into the Phase III configuration engine for
reliability purposes. At this time, we have no plans to conduct
flight operations above the 1092 thrust throttle settings. '.We`-
are currently assessing various configuration options for the
 Phase III engine. We will assess any limitations individually to
determine if design action should be undertaken in Phase III to
eliminate the restrictione
3 Landing Gear
ASAP Recommendation:
A complete structural and mechanical suitability review of the
Shuttle landing gear be made by an engineering organization with
commercial transport experience for the purpose of suggesting
alternative landing gear configurations and setting target
margins for structures and, the, whealstructures 	 axles., This	 ..
review shouId'include'but not be 1lmited-to:
a. The practicality of converting to a four—wheel
main gear truck within the present wheel well.
b. The practicality of putting an extended or extendable
strut on the nose gear for the purpose of changing the
	
i	 Orbiter ground attitude (more positive angle of attack),
thus relieving the main gear roll —out 'loads.
co The feasibility of increasing brake capacity by a major
	
r	
percentage (at least- 252).
	
ti	 d. A. thorough review of the weak points on the present gear
followed by suggestions for beef —up to "bring the margins
Into ,partial comparability; with the margins of modern
transport aircraft in the landing mode.
4NASA Response:
In consonance with part of the ASAP recommendation, the
Orbiter brake design and operational experience has now been
reviewed by an expert committee which included representatives
having commercial transport experience. The committee's findings
and recommendations were reviewed with the Panel on April 260
1964,,at JSC. The conclusions reached by the committee's board
R	 were: (1) no flight safety issue exists with the current design;
(2) a number of notable Orbiter brake design characteristics are
Different from currant industry design practices; ',(3)-the cause
r'	 of brake damage has not beenconclusively determined by analysis
and confirmed by ground tests, and there is insufficient flight
data; and (4) The potential contributors to damage are related to
dynamics, hydraulics l mechanical vibrationg and chatter.
The committee's board recommendations and 'status are listed
below:
(1) Addition offlight instrumentation. This has been
approved for implementation and is being installed
on Challenger for its next flight. The _redundant
Instrumentation being used should be sufficient to
characterize the brakes' dynamic performance
characteristics under actual flight conditions*
(2) Provision for hydraulic system damping. This is now
In work at Crane'Eydroa re for evaluation, to determine
the proper orifice sizing.
(3) Modifications of the brake hardware. The 3. 60 0 saddle
has been Installed on the two outboard wheels for STS
41-Do Clips for
+	 re esign	 and''vilf bee ayvailable r'fo r" STS841Ge being-
areT
heeb	 -
wheel lug/spline°covers -are being redesigned for deeper
contact between the wheel and brake and will be
available for 41G.
(4) Modifications to the crew pedal. This is a simple
- change which will be accomplished 'after the crew input
on their requirements.
(5) Testing of the carbon liner material. These testa have
been conducted to characterizecarbon liner material as
Input data for the math model of the brake system.
(6) 'Provide measurements of 'vehicle structure. This has
been approved to :provide data for the math model.
it
"'	 (7) Develop a math model. This is being accomplished both
at JSC and Rockwell. It is expected to be completed in
V	 about .6 months.
(8) Perform dynamometer testing at Wright Patterson.
Dynamometer testing is being performed at Goodrich.
The four ASAP recommendations have been studied, and the
following conclusions were reached;
a. The 4-wheel truck would require a major gear design
change and extensive.modification to the Orbiter wings to
Increase the landing, gear compartment size. This change
would be very expensive, and the vehicle would have to be
used as a test bed.
The longer nose gear would reduce the tire loads imposed
on the main landing gear and improve the single tire
rollout capability. However, the tires, along with the
wheals and bearings, ,haye been shown to provide adequate
margins. Although the longer gear design to possible, it
Is not simple and would introduce additional failure
modes if it were to be fitted within existing structural
Interfaces. It would cost about $50M and take about
three years to develop. However, with recognition to the
ASAP point, we are still giving redesign (extension)
consideration to provide the ` optimal , load relief for the
minimal program Impact.
c. It is feasible to increase the brake capacity by 14
percent using the existing wheel. The payoff would
not be significant that is, an increase of only several
knots in the, landing speed would result. The present
design will stop the vehicle in about 2500 feet after
application of brakes. That additional 14 percent
.,capacity would shorten the `landing distance' by about
300 feel. Greafas i'dcr'ed6hs'"in"brake capacity=.could ,•....
f	 be accomplished using structural carbon but 'would require
redesign of the wheel system. The present beryllium
carbon brakes are already designed to cover abort
landings up to the maximum (240,060 pounds) landing
weight allowed. The greatest braking 'capacity is
required. during emergency braking which imposes an energy
level of 55 million foot-pounds per brake or 220 million
foot-pounds for the>entira vehicle. The emergency
capability of 55 million foot-pounds per wheel has been
demonstrated during dynamometer,_ tests at Goodrich. The
energy ,used for the first 10 Shuttle flights has varied
from 26.7 to 142.2 million foot pounds per vehicle so a
substantial margin exists. A maximum pressure braking
test for a short duration of time was conducted on STS 6.
the result -being the shortest rollout distance achieved
be
(7180 feat). Clearly we are not pleased that brake
damages are being experienced and that operational
restrictions are placed upon the crew. However *
 as
mentioned earlier, these are not considered safrniy
critical failures, and steps are being taken tc
understand and fix &-he brakes by the addition of flight
instrumentation,,
 conduct of additional dynamometer tests,
and development of comprehensive dynamic math models. It
Is quite apparent that there will be some time before the
data can be gathetedo analyzed, and the corrected. It
should be noted that tae Orbiter, without the ability to
taxi, is unique from aircraft, and correcting this
problem will require more patiencethan with aircraft.
With this approach, however, we will have obtained the
best possible data, ie., from the flight itself rather
than by analysis or simulations.
The ASAP mentioned other concerns in the text regarding'
the brakes. One of these was the 75 pound ,force to
achieve the maximum 1500 psi brake pressure. The pedal
force has been designed to MIL-8-8584C and is consistent
with commercial transports. There is activity presently
underway to to lighten the pedal force loads.
While it is true that the Orbiter has been designed with
less margin of safety than commercial transports, another
ASAP concern, it should be observed that the condition
for which the design is based is a fully loaded landing
weight which is more stringent than the aborted take-off
requirements for commercialaircraft. Actually, the
fuselage is the load limiting component of the vehicle,'
not the'landing gear.
d. The landing gear has been reviewed numerous times during
JSC conducted structure reviews and has adequate margins
,gg..o4fety, App:, all expected flight; conditions. It is the
program's understenang ttiae tie' ASAi 'memtie "s' present
during the April presentation were satisfied with the
adequacy of the landing gear.
4. Logistics and Maintenance
ASAP Recommendationa:
A single authority should beestablished and responsible for all
logistic systems.
NASA Response:
The Office of Space Transportation issued on May 1, 19649
the "National. Space Transportation System, Space Shuttle
Integrated Logistics Support Policy" (SFO P0-110.5.). That
—
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document assigns overall responsibility for policy guidance,
resource allocation, and management over * ght"to the Director
of Space Shuttle Operations. Level II ^fi itepousible for the
management of the integrated logistics supp, : rt and is charged
with implementation of the policy. Space Shuttle Progiam
Directive No. 58A, dated March 25, 1983, was prepared to formally
establish the NASA / DOD Space Shuttle Integrated Logistics Panel
t	 (ILP). They have been meeting on approximately a quarterly
basis. The NASA DOD Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP) 9 co-chaired
by JSC and USAF, Space Division, 'represents the top authority over
combined ` NASA/USAF logistics programs and policies'. JSC, KSC
and M'SFC have a centralized Space Shuttle' Logistice Manager who
is the top authority over Space Shuttle Logistics for that
	 1'
center. Each center's logistics manager Is also a.member of the
ILP and presents center problems and areas of concern to the ILP
for resolution, Besides being the ILP co —chairman, the JSC
representative is responsible for implementing Space Shuttle
policies throughout the Shuttle program.
The logistics policy document has been prepared consistent
	 I:'
with the plan to transfer to RSC the various element logistics
management functions commencing with the ET and, SRM by January
1985 and the Orbiter and SSME by January 1988. These are
targeted is the latest dates,- and hopefully they can be moved 	 r,
forward.
ASAPRecommevidation b:1 
An overall maintenance plan should -be established attempting to
provide for at least the next decade.
NASA Response:
A long—term overall maintenance plan is being developed by
Level II for the Shuttle system. This plan will become a part of
• . ,.-the , STS) •hntegrated Operational Launch,:Site Support .Plau .,Zo be....
developed by January 1985.
The "Space 'Shuttle Integrated Logistics Support. Policy"
provides a statement In Section 8 relating to the_programla
maintenance and repair policy. Considerable activity is now
being devoted by Level II to updating the Shuttle Maintenance
Baseline document (JSC 08151). A Level I1 change request is
scheduled for action in early July and, when approved, will
formally control a,ll maintenance sources in accordance with
paragraph'; 8.5 of the policy. The plan is to prepare an
"Intermediate and Depot Maintenance Requirements System" (IDMS)
relating to maintenance as "Operations and Maintenance
Requirement Specification Documents" (OMRSD'e) relate to vehicle
processing. The objective is to be able to repair any device at
KSC in the event that a vendor goes out of business. "
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ASAP Recommendation as
The role of the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) in the vital
sphere of logistics should be clearly defined as noon as
possible.
NASA Response:
A clear and detailed definition of the SPC Logistics roles
and responsibilities is available in the Lockheed Space
	
Operations Company's (LSOC),DRL 040 Logistics Support Plan, dated	 j
January 10, 1984. A copy has been transmitted to Mr. Roth, ASAP
Staff Director, for the Panels use. Key logistics support
objectives are to:
(1) Develop plans for long —term support from off-site
maintenance facilities:
(2) "Establish a responsive and reliable transportation
pipeline to assure timely and damage free movement of SPC
material.
(3) Review subcontractor and vendor support for element'
hardware toensure than the most economical sources are being
used.
(4) Maintain accountability and control of all SPC spares
and equipment.
i
	
	
(5) Develop an approach with NASA/KSC/JSC/MSFC to minimize
the risk associatedwith out —.of —production flight hardware and
associated support equipment.
(6) Provide a logistics support system that uses a common
G;..da;a ,b4,se for provisioning and , , , reporting 	 is visible to users
F;
at RSC and Vandenberg launch Site.
.(7) Establish provisioning models that will ensure an
adequate depth of spare and repair parts to efficiently and .
economically support the mission model.
(8) Provide a method of tracking repairables in the repair
cycle to encourage a timely maintenance repair program
that is responsive to need dates and that provides maintenance
data for adjustment of.range'and depth of spare/repair
part, ,inventory, adjustment of maintenance activities, and
collection/control of maintenance costs..- 	
i
(9) Develop a, logistics launch readiness review system that
has a milestone for each mission.
""e1Aas^IStai^
_ .:: _ .---'---
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(10) Acquire that logistics operation and maintenance
documentation required to accomplish provisioning of spares,
overhaul, and repair planning.F	 .
ASAP Recommendation d:
Spacelab, Shuttle /Centaur, Inertial Upper Stage, and Payload
Assist Module should be 'included in the logistics plans.
e
NASA Response:
Although a great deal of progress has been made in support
of the Space Shuttle Logistics Elements, additional work needs
to be completed before the Space Shuttle carriers are formally
Integrated into NASA /DOD logistics plans. The decision not to
Include Spacelab, Inertial Upper Stage, and Payload Assist Module
(PAM) in the Integrated Logistics Panel
_ ( ILP) charter was briefed
to the NSTS Steering Group co-chairman in the NASA / DOD Logistics
briefing an January 11, 1954, Both co-chairmen ( NASA/DOD)
concurred with the " Space Shuttle only" concept of the ILP
charter. Under the present concept of the STS operations,
incorporation of the carriers into logistics will not be
considered until the STS elements have been adequately
accommodated. They are, of course, candidates for inclusion at
some future date. However, at the present time, logistics,
Including purchase of ,spares, is being handled by the ,sponsoring
organizations: Lewis Research Center, the Air Force, and
McDonnell Douglas. Since PAM is a commercial venture-, it
probably will not become a part of the Shuttle logistics system.
The uniqueness of the ESA developed and funded Spacelab required
a program which was independent of the :Shuttle during the R&D
phase. The 'Europeans have funded .some -spares and maintenance
activities which have been supplemented by NASA funding where
considered inadequate. As the R&D phase concludes,' NASA will
gradually phase Spacelab into the Shuttle Integrated Logistics
Program, and it Is anticipated that KSC will assume full
redponsibiiitt'foe'E`heiir''loglstics-'.,No• *date 'fibs been established,:-
however for completion of the turnover to KSC.
5. Orbiter Structural` Loads
ASAP Recommendation:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel recommends' that the National
Aeronautics and Space <Administration expedite the derivation of a ..
f	 new set of loads based on the latest wind tunnel and flight data.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel further recommends that
renewed efforts be made to validate the final derived structural
loads with full'-scale flight data*
ORMNAL PAGE it
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NASA Response:
We concur with the Panel's recommendation. Anew .loads
cycle (6,0) was initiated In October 1983 and is scheduled to be
R,	 completed by 1987. This loads cycle will update the Orbiter work
to include the latest wind tunnel and flight data to certify the
r.
	Orbiter f or full operational capability. The final derived
s	 structural roads will be validated with the full scale flight
data.
The OFT (Orbital Flight Test) Program results indicated
higher than anticipated loads on the Orbiter 'wing during ascentf
and higher than expected thermal stress during entry. In 1982
JSC initiated the OCA (Orbiter Capability Assessment) to address
these issues on a priority basis and to provide interim flight
.'	 clearance of the structure until a new `load/sttess cycle could be
completed.
t^
Current flights of the Orbiter are supported by the results
of OCA, with the exception of the wing. OCA results regarding
the wing did not satisfactorily match flight test results.
In some cases the differences were significant. Therefore,
each Orbiter in the flight Inventoryis having strain gages
installed in the wings to monitor flight load levels, and an
additional analytical task has been initiated to obtain a-better_
correlation between sero and structural loads and to,conduct
wing modifications. The current plan to resolve the wing problem
consists of the investigation of near-term structural modifi -
cations to achieve 'flight conditions required at the Western Test
Range and the evaluation of aerofixes, such as a spoiler, to
achieve flight conditions required in :he 1989 timsframe.
6. Orbiter 'Lan4 ng`Speed'and Pitch Control
•J	 •Y	 'y'•	 •	 • . 	 a	 i 	 •f:.
ASAP Recommendations;
NASA Headquarters should request Langley Research Center (LaRC).'
to review the "state of the art in canard configured aircraft,
and prepare briefings to the Aerospace Safety: Advisory Panel and
NASA Headquarters on the advantages and limitations of canard
configurations as applied to the Orbiter. Ink parallel, , Johnson '
Space Center ( JSC) should be asked to explore the ,practical
"	 problems ` of installing controllable canards on the 'Orbiters for
use in landing.
NASA Response:
In accordance with the ASAP request., Langley Research Center
has reviewed the use of canards. They will brief the ASAP and
NASA Headquarters in the near future.
xm
oRIONAL PAGE ib
AB POOR QUALITY	 11
JSC has explored the practical problems associated with
Installing canards on the Orbiter and presented its conclusions
to the Panel. During the presentations a brief background was
given, which provideda description of the present-Orbiter
landing characteristics and a discussion of possible canard
benefits. Canard studies in the early design phases of the
Orbiter and current Orbiter canard studies were summarized. The
practical problems were detailed which showed that to install
canards, the program would be required to commit to: redesign of
a number of on-board systems, structural redesign of the forward
fuselages, re-creation of wind tunnel data bases, and Orbiter
reverification	 Significant Orbiter down-time and schedule
Impacts would also results in summary, the impact of adding
canards to the present design are considered prohibitive compared
to the benefits. Future generation vehicles will include
consideration of ca °.ards.'
.r
7. Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC)
ASAP Recommendation:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration should clarify as
rapidly as possible its internal organizational arrangements: that
will support routine operation of the Space Transportation
System. Such organizational clarity will be a major factor in
achieving the objectives noted above and in assisting the SPC.
NASA Response:
KSC_has been reorganized to provide a single's principal
Interface with the SPC. Previously RSC'had three divisions with
launch operations responsibilities_which -have -now been combined
under one director (Shuttle Management and Operations) reporting
to the KSC Center Director. This. was accomplished prior to the
,,.. SPC contract shard, in. order,to,.unity. the management of , those
functions. More recently, the Director of the Shuttle Managemeat-
and Operations Directorate has been assigned the task of Contract
Manager of Lho$PC to insure close coordination of SPC and civil;
service personnel for launch operations.
The SPC Is now on-board. Although they have been
highly successful in' biting !°personnel who have 'prior
Shuttle experiences the level is not of a degree that
precludes NASA involvement. 	 New organizational techniques`
are used by this contractor, but the management is operating
in a takeover mode. What this means is that Lockheed had
planned and proposed to provide a service to NASA that had
been organized strictly for operatiouss not taking into
account the .realities that some integration tasks are still.
being implemented as we move toward an operational vehicle.
The Lockheed proposal presupposed that a: logistics program
Is In place and that no launch vehicle modifications would
be necessary. 'Thump a straightforward standardized 8040 of
operation was assumed. This, of course, did not permit
sufficient leeway for accomplishment of vehicle improveosnes,
and NASA involvement at this time has necessarily become
greater thanwhat SPC had anticipated before the award of the SPC
contract. After vehicle change activity is reduced, KSC will be
In -a position to proceed with full_ operational utility. However,
this delay could be to our advantage since we need to carefully
deliberate all=changes -to>a successful system.
Lockheed had proposed to implement a large number of
innovative changes or techniques for the Shuttle to become
orerational. These efforts are organized into major program
tasks in the areas of management, operations, process planning
and control, management systems, process/support operations, work
stations, and Vandenberg Launch Site Unique Operations. A
description and scheduling of these tasks may be obtained from
the KSC document entitled "Description of Evolution Tasks,
Initial Baseline," dated Match 22 9 1984	 (The ASAP Staff
Director has been given a copy for Panel use). _ The effort is too
extens.1ve to discuss here, and I would invite the Panel to visit`
KSC to review this subject in depth. Plans and schedules could
.be addressed at that time. What is significant is that an
evolution planexists and is receiving high level attention. The
Director of Shuttle Management and Operations conducts a half—day
meeting twice a week on the total program evolution. This
management pace is expected to continue into August to assure a
sound transition to operations.
In your report's conclusions, the Panel refers to
Implementation of a unified logistics system and acquiring
adequate spares. These are discussed in Recommendation No. 4.
The relationship between the Vandenberg Air Force Base and the
:,. KSC. Log, Shuttle operations, Is being worked between the KSC'
Director of Shu tle Management and, Opesations'"ind"Lt: den:"
McCartney, Commander of Spar>a Division. The Air Force and NASA
have agreed upon a policy for the'engineering role in which a
NASA /AF team directs the contractor. Mr. W. Murphy, formerly of
KSC'And now detailed to Vandenberg, heads that effort. :In that
tole, NASA reports to the Air Force (Col. Boland). Second level
directors are all NASA personnel. The staffing: is complete, and
personnel are in residence there now. The NASA operations role
has not been determined at this time. Lockheed Is proposing on a
•	 delta effort which would maintain resident force for the facility
and would provide travel for the KSC launch team for the small
number of Shuttlelaunches at VAFB, This approach represents our
current thinking and should not be construed as the final program
plan.
12
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8. Ssfet9 of Flight Operations
ASAP Recommendation:
A "Director" or "Chief" of Flight Operations should be identified
and should be the focal-point of flight safety matters in NASA
Headquarters.
This "Director" should serve as a channel of communication from
the branch flight operations level at the Centers to whatever
administrative level that is necessary to fully resolve a flight
safety problem.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters,
through the "Chief of Flight Operations" and the Intercenter-
Aircraft Operations Panel, should complement the supervision of
flight -operations with studies and educational programs aimed at
the human factor problem In aviation accidents and assure that
appropriate policy documents are issued by Headquarters to meet
operational safety needs.
NASA Response:
We have recently brought Mr. Gary Krier to Headquarters-
;	 to serve as Director of the Aircraft Management Office. His
responsibilities comprise overall aircraft operations and
I	 management. He is expected to provide the key channel of
communication to fully resolve flight operations problems.
The Chief- Engineer's Office has been deeply involved in
aviation safety oversight roles. That office is directly
supporting two major aircraft research programs underway in
OAST; the Rotor System Research Aircraft X-Wing Program and
the Controlled Impact Demonstration Program. Biennial aircraft
operations •roviews..ara:conduct.ed..at All,.centera..•in,conjunction
with the Intercenter Aircraft Operations Pansi (IAOP). Ai the
i request ofthe IAOP, training to the panel in the area of systems
safety concepts and procedures was provided. This office is
contributing a heightened safety awareness to the centers in
providing: guidance on aircraft fire extinguishers, aircraft
d	 accident- checklists, accident investigation kits, and video
tape@, in addition to nearly daily requests on a variety of other	 .
safety subjects. Further, -;,the <oversight role is enhanced through
liaison with other agencies and services, as exemplified by the
f	 recent Memorandum of Agreements with the USAF and the Army, to	 y
exchange mishap data on aircraft of mutual interest.
r
	
	
At`my request, flight operations reviews were conducted by
Ecosystems International, Inc *
 to assess the level ofaviation
flight. safety activities_ at the Langley Research Center in
September of 1982; Johnson Space Center in November of 1982 and
Y
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Ames Research Center and its Dryden Flight Facility in December
of 1983. The review team found that all the activities reviewed
were performing ins highly professional ond •eompatent manner.
The other ASAP point was .
 the need to compleneneihe
supervision of flight operations with studies and educational
programs aimed at the Involvement of human factors in accidents.
It is becoming increasingly evident that both the physical
aspects of the cabin lay-out and the mental make-up of its
occupants comprise the total realm of human factors.
	 Over the
years, the Agency, as well as others in the aircraft industry,
has recognized the importance of the physical part # that is, the
placement of switches and controls, the ease and readability of
Instruments, and other such physical parameters. However, the
psychological make-up of personnel has not been as readily
acknowledged as an independent contributor, and therefore little
Is known about it. Research is being conducted by both the FAA
and the USAF. NASA monitors the efforts in this field and
maintains cognizance of results to date. However, we are unaware
of courses on this subject that would be effective in avoiding
the type of accidents in which the crew's psychological make-up
plays a key role.
We have made progress on two other areas which the Panel
addressed In the Annual Report: enhancement of effective -	—
communication and upgrading policies and management instructions.
I would _like to address these two subjects as well.
In facing up to communicationinadequacies, I, believe that
the Agency has now taken significant steps to enhance effective
communication on aviation safety and related matters, both up and
down the management chain from Headquarters to the flight
operations at the centers, as well as laterally at the center
level. For one thing, we have increased the frequency with which
the IAOP meets to discuss safety issues. This panel met at the
USAF Safety_Center . In. December ,••:at ,JSC in -Harch, and .et, XS.C. An
June, a fourfold increase over previous history. For another,
the IAOP is now sponsoring a newsletter that will publicize on a
quarterly' basis significant aviation activity.
The Center Aviation Safety Officers (ASO), at a recent ASO'
meeting conducted at Ft. Rucker, Alabama, praised the significant
Improvements in Intercenter`communications. NASA was pleased
that one of the ASAP members, Lieutenant General Davis, was able
to participate in this meeting end welcomed his participation and
Inputs.
We have taken measures to insure that communications are
supported b ay ppropriate actions 	 produce more effective
Implementation of safety. To this end, more emphasis is being
placed on operations reviews which include safety. So far',
reviews since December 1983 include Dryden, KSC, Wallops and
_.	 i.	
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Lewis. Three other reviews are scheduled this yeast
ti
Langlayo Johnson, and Marshall.
We are in the process of updating the Headquarters aircraft
and flight operationspolicies and management instructions. The
^	 status and schedule of each is presented below.
Number	 Title	 Schedule
NMI 1152.47E	 Intercenter Aircraft Panel	 Published
NMI 7920.1A	 Administrative Aircraft 	 August 1984
NMI 7910 . 1B	 NASA Aircraft Management	 Signed
NMI 7910 . 2	 Airworthiness	 Published
NEB 7920.x
	 Administrative Aircraft	 Fall 1984
Operations Manual
In addition * we already have updated revisions of the
following documents.
NMI 1102.2C	 Roles and Responsibilities foe the Associate
Administrator for Space Technology
IL
	NMI 1103.D	 Roles and Responsibilities for the Chief Engineer
NMI 1103.0	 Roles and Responsibilities for the Associate
Administrator for Management Operations
NMI 7900.18`	 Delegation of Authority to Approve Policies and
Other Matters Related to NASA Aircraft
a
